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Plato on Art, Perspective, and 
Beauty in the Sophist1
Fiona Leigh
With only a few exceptions, readers of Plato’s later dialogue, the Sophist, 
have not usually associated it with Platonic aesthetics.2 But this is to 
overlook two important features of the dialogue. First, the unfavourable 
contrast, built up throughout the dialogue, between the practice of 
sophistry–likened to the practice of the mimetic arts (235c-236e)–and 
the practice of philosophy. Only the latter, the Stranger implies, affords 
the possibility of what we might call an aesthetic experience, i. e., the 
experience of beauty in the soul, while the former results in ugliness 
(230d-e).3 Second, it overlooks the argument at 235d-236c, offered by 
the main speaker in the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger, for the claim that 
certain artworks, such as monuments and large paintings, are necessarily 
illusory. The argument is brief but important, since it introduces the 
idea that the success of these artworks depends on their being at once 
perspectival–producing for the viewer or audience an appearance of 
something via a representation designed to adjust or correct for the 
viewer’s perspective–and at the same time hiding or concealing this 
perspectival nature. This has the result that the audience thinks only of 
the object that appears, the object depicted in the representation, not the 
artwork or representation itself, or its adjustments and corrections. In 
this sense, the artwork is a distortion, and false. The implication, we will 
see, is that sophistry produces appearances or images in words in just the 
same way, and they too are distortions, falsehoods.
The contrast between sophistical and philosophical practice together 
with the analogy between sophistry and artistic production is reminiscent 
of the unfavourable treatment, in book X of the Republic, of mimetic 
poetry in the ideal city, an ideal city structured by and ruled according 
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to philosophical practice (595a ff.). So the Sophist, too, confronts us with 
the following troubling problem: As Michael Frede once stated, ‘Plato’s 
dialogues are works of art … pieces of powerful dramatic ﬁction.’4 Is 
not his own work, then, vulnerable to the criticism he levels against the 
mimetic arts and sophistry: that they are illusory, false and harmful? If 
not, in virtue of what are Plato’s dialogues to be distinguished from other 
depictions of reality, dramatic or otherwise? My central claim in this paper 
is that in the Sophist Plato furnishes the reader with the means for a solution 
to the problem, by distinguishing the practice of philosophy–conceived 
of as dialectic–from the practice of sophistry and the mimetic arts. I will 
suggest that the Sophist provides reason to think that the dialogues escape 
this criticism since they do not offer authoritative claims to truth. That is, 
they do not offer claims presented as beyond revision, but on the contrary, 
claims that draw attention to their own perspectival nature.
I mentioned above that the conception of a beautiful soul ﬁgures in 
the Stranger’s remarks on the beneﬁts of knowledge, as contrasted with 
the deleterious effects of submitting oneself to the teaching of sophists. 
However, the conception of beauty at work here, and its relation to truth 
and knowledge, is not argued for or defended in our dialogue, but instead 
appears to be presupposed: there is nothing in the Sophist that counts as 
an advance in Plato’s thought on the conception of beauty. Nonetheless, 
as a preliminary, I want ﬁrst to review this conception in the corpus, 
and its connection to truth, knowledge, and virtue, in order to provide 
a broader context within which to situate the importance accorded to a 
beautiful soul in the Sophist. We will see that the experience of beauty 
generally, and coming to have a beautiful soul in particular, is desirable 
because it has moral value. We will also see, however, that aesthetic value 
is not thereby reduced to moral value, since it will emerge that the soul’s 
beauty is for Plato a constituent of the good life, of eudaimonia, and not 
simply a means towards that end.
I. Background: Truth, knowledge, virtue and the role of the aesthetic 
in Plato
The connection between virtue (or excellence, aretê) and beauty (or 
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the ﬁne, to kalon) is a common enough one in Greek, and that between 
truth and beauty a common enough one in the history of aesthetics, 
but in Plato these connections are especially prominent. For him, the 
aesthetic experience–the experience of beauty–serves to inspire the soul 
towards what is for Plato an exemplary goal: the attainment of truth, 
and knowledge of the Forms.5 But the aesthetic experience also plays a 
constitutive role in the good life for Plato, or so I shall argue later in this 
section. It is only once we pay attention to this role for the conception of 
beauty and its relation to the soul in Plato that we can fully appreciate the 
seriousness of Plato’s worries about sophistry, and certain mimetic arts, 
as well as his interest in dialectical philosophy, in the Sophist.
It is in the ‘erotic’ dialogues that the instrumental role of beauty in the 
process of acquiring knowledge–as that which moves us to seek knowledge 
and become virtuous–is emphasised. In the Symposium Diotima paints the 
startling image of people who are pregnant in their souls through the 
overarching desire to ‘beget in beauty’ (206e, 208e-209a). According to 
her, it is this, and not the actual possession of the beautiful love object, as 
the young Socrates had thought, that is the ultimate driving force of love 
(204d, 207d-e). Lovers of this kind, she says, are pregnant with what ‘it is 
ﬁtting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. And what is ﬁtting? Wisdom 
and the rest of virtue …’ (209a). If such a lover
… has the luck to ﬁnd a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed, he 
is even more drawn to this combination; such a man makes him instantly 
teem with ideas and arguments about virtue–the qualities a virtuous man 
should have and the customary activities in which he should engage; and 
so he tries to educate him … .  And whether they are together or apart, he 
remembers that beauty. (209b-c)
A little later on, Diotima famously describes the ascent of the soul 
of the lover, as it progresses from loving beautiful bodies all the way to 
loving the Form of Beauty itself, which remains forever beautiful and the 
same, and in which all other beautiful things share (211a ff.). Along the 
way the soul directs its attention to ‘various kinds of knowledge’, so that 
it sees ‘the beauty of knowledge’, experiences a great variety of beauty in 
‘beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom’,6 and ﬁnally 
comes to have, though perhaps through glimpses, knowledge of the Form 
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of Beauty itself.7
In the Phaedrus, Socrates focuses more keenly on the relation between 
beauty and truth. There, in his second speech, he endeavours to explain 
varying psychological types by delineating which god different souls 
followed in the divine procession of the pantheon, prior to mortal birth. 
Each one of these souls strains to get a glimpse of ‘reality’ (ta onta, 248a5, 
248b4 cf. 247e1-3), which Socrates goes on to describe as located on ‘the 
plain where truth stands’ (248b). ‘This pasture,’ he says, 
… has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul, and it is 
the nature of the wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it … . [A] 
soul that has seen the most [truth] will be planted in the seed of a man who 
will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the 
arts and prone to erotic love. (248c-d) 
The image of wings of the soul nourished on truth is augmented in the 
following lines, where the soul of a man who practices philosophy begins 
to grow wings that return him to the divine realm more than three times 
faster than the man who does not (249a; cf. 249c-d). Though the role of 
truth is at the fore in the telling of this myth, beauty and the virtues also 
play their part in the soul’s progress back to heaven. Socrates says that 
justice and self-control, and the other things the soul admires do not shine 
brightly in their ‘images’ (homoiômata, 250b3) in the sensible realm, so that 
only a few people, with difﬁculty, can grasp the corresponding Forms 
(the ‘originals’) themselves. In contrast, because it often characterises 
what is visible in the sensible world, beauty is striking, and more easily 
apprehended by mortal souls. When a person encounters another who is 
beautiful in soul or body, he is consumed with desire. Now, if the lover 
is sufﬁciently self-aware and self-controlled (i. e. possesses sophrosunê), 
the psychology of this desire will see the lover remain ardent yet 
concerned with the beloved’s best interests, and the pair will embark on 
a jointly beneﬁcial lifelong quest to engage in philosophy, and pursue the 
acquisition of knowledge and shared understanding (253d-256e). This, in 
turn, enables their souls to grow the wings that will eventually lead them 
back to the divine realm after death (256b).
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Beauty, therefore, clearly plays a significant role in driving and 
inspiring the soul to acquire knowledge and attain virtue and eudaimonia 
for Plato: the aesthetic experience has clear instrumental moral value. 
However, there is reason to think that the value of the aesthetic is not, for 
Plato, merely instrumental. For, the amelioration of the soul engendered 
by the process of coming to knowledge and virtue ends in the production 
of two distinct things, each of which is characterised by beauty. One, we 
have seen, is the production of knowledge of beautiful things in the soul 
(e. g., people, constitutions, theories, Forms). The other is the production 
of a soul that is itself beautiful: the process of the soul’s coming to know is 
at the same time a process of its becoming beautiful. A number of passages 
in the corpus bear this out. In the Republic, e. g., the young guardians are 
made beautiful in soul as well as body by education in music and in poetry, 
which involves, we are told at 402c, knowledge ‘of self-control, courage … 
and all their kindred’.8 In the dialogue named after him, it is said that if the 
young Charmides were as beautiful of soul as he were of body and face he 
would be temperate or self-controlled, and, Socrates implies (and Critias 
agrees), he would have the other virtues as well (157d-e, cf. Tht. 185e). In 
the Phaedrus, the love that is enjoyed between lover and beloved when 
they follow the dictates of philosophy–engage in philosophical discussion 
in the search for knowledge–is represented in terms of their common 
beauty: Plato makes use of a mirror analogy to describe how the beauty 
of their souls ﬂows back and forth between them in the course of this kind 
of relationship (255c-e).9 In the Protagoras, Socrates declares (somewhat 
facetiously, we might think) that Protagoras is much more beautiful than 
Alcibiades, on the grounds of his superlative wisdom (309c).10 And in the 
Symposium, Alcibiades does not give an encomium of love but a speech in 
praise of Socrates, as a person of outstanding courage (219e-221c), as well 
as strength and wisdom (219d; 221d-222a)–but he also tells how Socrates, 
when he heard the gorgeous young man’s high opinion of his character, 
remarked that if that were true then his (i.e. Socrates’) soul would have 
an almost indescribable beauty (218e).11
Both products of philosophical discourse–a virtuous soul and the 
knowledge it comes to possess– are characterised as beautiful.12 We are 
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also clearly told in the Symposium that these kinds of beauty–beauty of the 
soul and beauty of knowledge–are kinds that are instantly recognizable 
to the soul as beauty (209b-c, cf. Phaedrus 250d-e). So we may conclude, I 
submit, that the virtuous, knowing soul knows its own beauty as well as the 
beauty of the knowledge it has acquired. Finally, these beautiful products 
of philosophical discourse, virtue and knowledge, and the aesthetic 
experience that characterises them, are themselves ends, not pursued for 
the sake of anything else.13 That is, they are each elements in the good 
that is, when it is achieved, constitutive of eudaimonia (Symp. 204e-205a, 
cf. 212a). Neither is, therefore, purely an instrumental good for Plato.14 
The production of beauty, and the soul’s experience of this beauty, are not 
merely tools that aid in the individual’s attainment of happiness–they are 
rather themselves parts of a ﬂourishing human life, and so can arguably be 
classiﬁed as intrinsic goods for Plato.15 At any rate, given that the aesthetic 
plays a constitutive role in Plato’s conception of eudaimonia, such that the 
virtue and beauty of a soul are mutually entailing, and both presuppose 
the possession of knowledge and truth, the Stranger’s characterisation 
of a clean–and, he implies, knowing–soul as beautiful at 230d-e is hardly 
surprising. What is perhaps a little surprising is his further allegation that 
the opposite sort of soul, one that is ignorant of its own state of ignorance, 
should be characterised so harshly in opposite terms, as distorted and 
ugly. For, it’s not immediately obvious why a soul that lacks beauty should 
be ugly, rather than be characterised in more neutral aesthetic terms. We 
might also want an argument for the admittedly familiar, but no less 
serious, claim that what the sophist produces and sells is falsehood. It is to 
a study of these allegations and the arguments for them, which ultimately 
turn on the analysis of perspective, that we now turn.
II. The threat of sophistry: ignorance and ugliness, knowledge and 
beauty
The Stranger and Theaetetus set out, at the beginning of the Sophist, 
to give an account of sophistry, a task that busies them for fully a third of 
the dialogue, and which sees them produce no less than seven different 
formulations of what this art consists in. In their ﬁfth attempt to deﬁne 
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the eponymous sophist, the Stranger directs Theaetetus to the art of 
discrimination that is concerned with separating out the better from the 
worse and discards the worse, which art he labels ‘cleansing’ (226b-d). 
They agree that cleansing of the body is distinct from cleansing of the soul, 
the former being concerned with medicine, gymnastics and bathing, the 
latter with a kind of thinking. Just as body-cleansing sometimes treats 
disease, soul-cleansing treats wickedness, the two forms of which are 
viciousness and ignorance (228d-e).
Ignorance is characterised as a kind of ugliness of the soul, since it 
comes about when the soul is discordant and out of proportion within 
itself (228a-b). This discord or disfigurement of the soul, strikingly 
characterised by the Stranger in the next lines as ‘derangement’ or ‘being 
beside itself’ (paraphrosunê, 228d2), is analysed as a psychological state 
that comes about when one aims at truth and understanding but swerves 
aside, leaving one beside oneself. As I understand it, the point here is 
that despite the soul’s own best efforts, it arrives at a state it did not 
desire–ignorance, which state is incompatible with what it does desire, 
namely, the truth, or understanding. The soul defeats the satisfaction of 
its own desire for knowledge. Thus in the souls of such people there is 
dissention between ‘belief and desire, anger and pleasure, reason and 
pain, and of all these between each other’ (228b2-3).16 The Stranger then 
identiﬁes one major kind of ignorance that is large and overshadows the 
others–thinking oneself to know when one does not. The kind of cleansing 
most important and effective for this sort of ignorance, he says at 230d7-
9, is cross-examination or refutation (elenkhein), which ends in placing 
conﬂicting opinions next to one another. Seeing his beliefs conﬂict, the 
person being examined realises his lack of learning and (unwitting state 
of) ignorance, and his soul is thereby cleansed. The implication is that he 
is now in a position to learn and to acquire knowledge: anyone who has 
not undergone this process is ‘uneducated and ugly, in just the ways that 
the one who is really going to be happy is most clean and most beautiful’ 
(230e2-4, tr. after White).
This kind of cleansing education, if it is any kind of sophistry at all, 
is a ‘noble’ sophistry (231b). The Stranger emphasizes that he is hesitant 
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to conclude that this art is a genuine sort of sophistry, lest they pay the 
sophist a compliment he doesn’t deserve, although he lets the description 
stand ‘for now’. He notes that to dispute the point would be to debate 
what sophistry is as no trivial matter, adding that when the sophist is at 
the top of his game, the business of hunting him down with an accurate 
description will involve disputing an important distinction (231a-b). I 
interpret these provocative yet vague remarks of the Stranger in a twofold 
way. On the one hand, it can hardly be overlooked that Socrates, the most 
famous practitioner of elenchos in Greece, is sitting right there, observing 
proceedings in silence.17 So the Stranger is communicating to those present, 
but most pointedly to Socrates, that he appreciates the great value of 
discovering the conﬂicting beliefs that underpin a pervasive and powerful 
(though unwitting) form of ignorance, while at the same time qualifying 
his praise by making it clear that this negative process does not itself end 
in the positive state of knowledge acquisition. On the other hand, I take 
it that he is deliberately foreshadowing the tension between the boasts of 
sophistry and its accomplishments, by suggesting that the cleansing art of 
cross-examination is not in fact an art the sophist practices. Indeed, as we 
will see shortly, the sophist falsely claims to know an enormous number 
of things he does not know. It follows that under sustained questioning, 
the sophist will ﬁnd himself faced with his own conﬂicting beliefs, either 
because his knowledge claims turn out to conﬂict with the phenomena 
(234d-e), or with each other (e. g., Gorg. 460e-461a). Thus, despite his claim 
to expertise, the sophist too is infected by this pervasive kind of ignorance, 
and far from possessing the cleansing art, in fact possesses an ugly soul 
that stands in need of the art’s application.
At 234c-d, the Stranger depicts the sophist as using words to trick 
young people about reality, since they stand far from the truth, ‘by 
putting words in their ears, and by showing them spoken images of 
everything, so as to make them believe that the words are true and the 
person who’s speaking to them is the wisest person that there is’ (234c, 
cf. 233b). In consideration of the sophist’s claim to know so much about 
so many domains of knowledge, the Stranger and Theaetetus agree that 
he cannot possibly possess knowledge about all the things in the cosmos, 
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as he claims (232a-e; 233a-b; 233d-234b). On the contrary most, if not 
all, of his knowledge claims must be false (233a; 235a).18 Now, sophists 
profess to teach virtue (224b-c; cf. Rep. 493a-d)–as well as a host of other 
things–though now they are revealed to lack knowledge of this subject. 
Therefore both patrons and students of sophists alike, to the extent that 
they take themselves to have knowledge as a result of the sophist’s 
teaching, think they know when they do not, and so are characterised by 
the worst and largest kind of ignorance. It is the worst kind because, we 
may speculate, in mistakenly thinking themselves to know when they 
do not, these people will reject claims that conﬂict with their own beliefs, 
even when they are true, and will no longer engage in inquiry or seek out 
knowledge. But, just as we would expect in light of the remarks on truth, 
knowledge and beauty in the Platonic corpus surveyed above, without 
knowledge these people cannot, by Plato’s lights, ﬂourish or achieve 
happiness. In spite of their efforts to the contrary, it seems, these people 
have ended up with deformed, ugly souls, and are in fact prevented from 
attaining eudaimonia (230e).
As they get older, however, the sophist’s students have immediate 
experience with real things (tôn ontôn, 234d4), and their direct encounter 
with the facts causes them to change their earlier beliefs, instilled in them 
by the sophist, which ‘made large things appear small and easy things 
appear hard’ (235d). Maturity and experience combine, it seems, to bring 
about some measure of the soul’s self-cleansing on the part of these former 
students. The sophist, nonetheless, is concerned only that the appearances–
the images he creates in words–strike his audience as accurate depictions 
of reality, and not whether they are so. He is also concerned with his own 
appearance: we are told at the end of the dialogue, at 267c, that the sophist 
works hard to make others believe that the character of justice and all the 
virtues together are present in him, and that he is adept at appearing to 
be so, while he is not in fact so (cf. 233b; 234c).
But why should we be convinced by Plato in the Sophist that what the 
sophist teaches is false? The Stranger suggests that one reason is that the 
sophist professes to be able to instruct on every possible subject (232b-
233c; 234b-235a). The implication is that since it would be impossible for 
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anyone to know so much, the sophist must lack knowledge and so teach 
falsehoods. Of course, the reasoning is hardly persuasive, and the claim is 
at best a weak one. Even if the sophist does not have knowledge of much 
of what he teaches, or claims to be able to teach, he may nonetheless have 
knowledge of some subject areas. Moreover, supposing we grant Plato the 
claim that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, it nevertheless 
does not follow that a person who lacks knowledge does not possess or 
believe true propositions. The key, I suggest, lies in the Stranger’s analysis 
of the product of the sophist’s art as an appearance that, in contrast to a 
faithful likeness, is necessarily illusory.
III. Illusory appearances, faithful likenesses, and perspective
Having depicted the sophist as a cheat and an imitator, the Stranger 
goes on to effectively acknowledge that he has not yet given a satisfactory 
account of sophistry. For imitation can be faithful, and preserve such 
things as correct proportion and proper colouring (235d-e). The task, then, 
is to analyse that feature of sophistry that distinguishes it from faithful 
imitation and in such a way that explains its (alleged) faithlessness, and 
it is the task that Stranger now turns his attention to. 
In the passage from 235c to 236d, the Stranger elaborates on the 
nature of the products of sophistry, which he had earlier, at 234c5 and 
234e1, characterised as images (eidôla) and appearances (phantasmata) 
respectively. At 235eff., he contrasts the (faithful) type of imitation called 
likeness-making with another type of imitation involved in the production 
of the sculpting or drawing of large artworks. These imitations alter the 
proportion of the parts of the object in the appearance of it, to take into 
account the distance of the viewer from the various parts, so that it in 
fact appears to have the correct proportion. Michelangelo’s statue of 
David, for instance, has a disproportionately large head, and one of the 
hands of the boy is noticeably larger than the other. The sculptor made 
the statue this way because it was originally intended that it be viewed 
from a distance, the viewer standing on the other side of the Piazza della 
Signoria in Florence (where a replica stands today). In adjusting for the 
viewer’s distance from the head, as compared to her distance from the 
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feet and the rest of the torso, which would be slightly less, the appearance 
of the statue would be, for the viewer, of normal proportions. Moreover, 
the enlarged size of the hand (that in the myth let loose the rock that 
killed Goliath), is designed to draw the viewer’s gaze, emphasizing its 
signiﬁcance. The opposite effect is regularly produced in (regular sized) 
paintings, with which we are more familiar in contemporary times. Since 
a painting of a view of the acropolis from the port of Pireas, for instance, 
is designed to reproduce the appearance of the monument from the point 
of view of someone actually standing at the port, the part of the painted 
building that has the appearance of being furthest away from the viewer 
has considerably shorter columns, on the canvas, than those that make 
up the part of the building in the painting that appears nearest. And if 
a painter were to produce a very large painting, of the kind of scale of 
works still found on the walls of the Vatican or other galleries and palazzo 
elsewhere in Italy, he or she may well adjust for viewer perspective by 
making what is large appear small and vice versa (cf. 235e-236a).19
Now, the Stranger’s remarks here could be intended to have a fairly 
restricted scope–covering only such works or artifacts that require the 
craftsperson to consider viewer perspective, such as the large sculptures 
or drawings he mentions. However, at 236b-c the Stranger says the 
illusory practice found in these sorts of arts is indicative of many artistic 
products and the mimetic arts generally. Further, the context of the analysis 
of perspective in these mimetic arts–embedded within the Stranger’s 
criticism of sophistry as productive of falsehoods–strongly suggests that 
the analysis is to be applied to sophistry. If this is right, then the allusion to 
these artisans is intended to show that their art is analogous to sophistry in 
the respect of the production of certain sorts of representations or images. 
The production of certain paintings, or the construction of a monument or 
statue in order that it appear a certain way, is called the appearance-making 
kind (phantastikê, 236c4) of imitative art (mimêtikê), and is distinguished 
by the method of collection and division from likeness-making, which 
faithfully reproduces proportion, colour, etc. The suggestion, therefore, is 
that appearance-making ought to be associated with the art of sophistry 
as much as it is associated with a great deal of mimetic production, since 
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both rely on the production of what is false while retaining the impression 
of not being so.20 And again, the Stranger had already characterised the 
products of sophistry as appearances (phantasmata) at 234e1 (and also 
refers to them by way of phainesthai at 236e1). So the analysis of certain 
mimetic arts as illusory appears to present Theaetetus (and the reader) 
with what is meant to be an illuminating analogue to sophistry. The 
suggestion is reinforced–I think decisively–by the observation that in 
the closing statement of the dialogue, the Stranger describes sophistry in 
terms of a string of differentia, one of which is ‘the appearance-making 
kind of image-making’ (268c9-d1).
The key point about the nature of what is produced by this kind of 
artistic imitation, (which, again, we are told covers a great part of painting 
and the imitative arts generally at 236b-c) is that it is an appearance of a 
thing of a certain sort (e. g. of a certain proportion), which seems to be of 
that sort while it is in fact not of that sort (235e-236c). I take this to mean 
that the product of this sort of imitation is a depiction or representation 
of the original object according to which it appears thus-and-such, though 
the features of the imitation itself, considered as an object on its own 
and apart from what it represents, are not in fact thus-and-such (235e-
236c). Some features will, it seems, need to be preserved in the product 
of imitation in order for it to be imitative–so Michelangelo’s statue had 
better be recognisable as David if it is to invoke a sense of the small 
population’s spirit of deﬁance and willingness to defend Florence’s seat 
of government from encroaching external powers. But the point is that 
the vast majority of the appearances that are the products of the imitative 
arts depend for their success on representing the original object falsely. So 
while the statue has some characteristics in common with the character, 
David, a young shepherd (youthful physique, appropriate clothing), it 
also has characteristics not attributable to him (an overly large head and 
right hand). 
It is thus possible for an imitation to appear beautiful to the viewer of 
the imitation in the same way the intentional object itself appears beautiful 
to the apprehension unmediated by imitation, e. g. as the (mythical) David, 
or the (actual, physical) acropolis appears beautiful, without preserving 
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the characteristics–in this case, proportion–in virtue of which the original 
does appear beautiful (235e). In such cases, it is in virtue of the relevant 
visual device that the appearance appears beautiful (236a). Necessarily 
then, what the Stranger has called an ‘appearance’ and has distinguished 
from a ‘likeness’, is something that appears like the object it imitates with 
regards to a certain characteristic, but is not in fact like that object in itself 
preserving and possessing that characteristic.
The point is key because this is the respect, I submit, in which the 
nature of sophistry is analogous to the nature of the mimetic arts. That is, 
the products of sophistry are appearances, or particular sorts of images 
in words (234c). They are appearances in the sense that they are designed 
in such as way as to cause an appearance, in the mind of somebody ‘far 
away from the truth’ (234c), of an object characterised a certain way, 
though which appearance does not in fact preserve this characteristic. So, 
e. g., a sophist might present an appearance of a just person as someone 
who always obeys the law (Rep. I, 339b-c)21, or of the human good as the 
power to do as one sees ﬁt (Gorgias, 466b-c; cf. 452d, 469c). Or he might 
teach that virtue is one thing for a man, another thing for a woman, and 
yet another for a slave or child (Meno, 71e-72a). He might even argue for 
the idea that to wish for someone to become wise is to wish for their death 
(Euthyd., 283b-d), or that the two virtues, courage and wisdom, are so 
distinct that courage should be considered non-cognitive in the sense of 
not requiring knowledge or wisdom (Prot. 330a-b, 349d, 359a-c, 360e). In 
the ﬁrst three examples, where the sophist succeeds, the intentional object 
of the appearance appears to be just or good or virtuous to the intended 
audience, though in each case it turns out that it is not. In the last two 
examples, the prospect of a person becoming what he is not appears to be 
the prospect of death, and the virtues appear related to one another as the 
parts of a face to one another, though again, in both cases things are not this 
way (at least according to Socrates). That these various intentional objects 
appear these ways is, analogously with the imitative arts, a function of 
two features of the appearance: the false characteristics of the appearance, 
and facts to do with the audience’s perspective.
First, consider the claim that the appearance is constituted by false 
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characteristics in a way that is relevantly analogous to the mimetic arts 
discussed. These are characteristics that are not in fact characteristics of 
the intentional object (so the appearance is not like the object in the way 
we have seen a faithful likeness to be), though they can plausibly seem to 
be characteristics of it. Thus, it can appear that someone who conforms to 
the law is just, just as it can seem that the good life is underwritten by the 
ability to do as one wishes, when one wishes, and that being an excellent 
(i. e., virtuous) person involves distinct behaviour or character states for a 
man, woman, slave, and child. It can also appear that becoming something 
you are not involves ceasing to be who you are, and would therefore seem 
to imply death, just as it can appear that courage does not in every instance 
involve some prior deliberation, so that it is not an intellectual virtue, and 
so separate and independent from wisdom.22 These appearances that 
the sophist produces, or could produce, are propositions, or images in 
words (234c). And like the large artworks of the painter or sculptor, they 
depend on certain facts about the perspective of their audience. In the 
case of sophistry, however, these are facts about the audience’s intellectual 
perspective, not their physical, perceptual perspective.
I have already noted the audience’s distance from the truth is one 
feature of the cognitive perspective of the students of sophistry, according 
to the Stranger (234c, cf. 234e). That is, the considerable ignorance of the 
audience contributes signiﬁcantly to the success of the propositions or 
accounts put forward by the sophist. That ignorance is indeed necessary 
for the logoi of sophistry to appear in the desired way, and so to have 
the effect of being persuasive to the sophist’s audience, is conceded by 
Gorgias in the dialogue named after him at 459a-b (cf. 456b-c.) There, 
Gorgias agrees that the (ignorant) orator, who Socrates groups with 
sophists and other ﬂatterers (463b-c), will only be more persuasive than 
the (knowledgeable) doctor on the subject of medicine if the audience is 
ignorant about such matters, since those who already have knowledge 
will not be more persuaded by the orator than by the doctor. 
The Stranger can also be seen to suggest two other features of the 
particular cognitive perspective most desirable to the sophist in his 
audience. One is the possession, on behalf of the audience member, of false 
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beliefs that are popular, or at least have a certain currency at the time. For 
when presented by the sophist with views or assertions that are familiar 
and well-regarded by others, the student is more likely to be persuaded, 
either because it is easy and pleasant to hold the same view as others, or 
because it’s less risky to assent to something one has at least heard of before 
than to some suspiciously new idea that nobody believes. The Stranger 
suggests such a role for false popular belief in his characterisation of the 
craft of sophistry at 223e-224e as the expertise involved in traveling from 
one place to another and buying and selling items he (the sophist) describes 
as knowledge or ‘learnings’ (ta mathêmeta) concerning virtue, either items 
he has purchased or has himself ‘made’ (tektainomai). In doing so, Plato has 
the Stranger paint a picture of the sophist as primarily, if not exclusively, 
concerned with the marketability of an account or claim about virtue, at 
the same time as being wholly unconcerned with the inconsistency that 
is certain to show up between his seemingly vast store of such items of 
‘knowledge’ at any time. This picture is conﬁrmed a little later on when the 
Stranger points out that the sophist is willing to engage in controversies 
about anything at all (232b-e). And his remark at 234a that the sophist 
sells a kind of belief-knowledge about every subject, which is not true 
but that is quickly made, easy to learn and inexpensive to buy, further 
reinforces the notion that he deals in claims and ideas that are popular 
and highly persuasive.23
The other feature of the audience’s cognitive perspective that the 
Stranger suggests is desirable to the sophist is the desire, on the part 
of the audience member, for pleasure or gratiﬁcation, in exchange for 
cash. At 234b, the Stranger and Theaetetus agree that sophistry is a kind 
of a game of controversy and debate (eristic) and that no other game is 
more engaging (khariesteron). The remark echoes the huge entertainment 
value accorded to the highly proﬁtable sophistic displays of eristic and 
oratory in the Gorgias and elsewhere (458c-d; cf. Euthyd. 274b; Prot. 315a-c; 
Hipp. Maj. 282b-e).24 It also echoes, of course, Socrates’ deeply insulting 
suggestion to Polus and Gorgias that oratory and sophistry are each a 
knack for producing pleasure and gratiﬁcation, on the grounds that each 
ﬂatters the students of sophists into thinking themselves wise because 
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they appear wise.25 The same sentiments are expressed in the Sophist, 
albeit more brieﬂy, by the Stranger. The remark that sophistry is the most 
engaging of games follows immediately after the assertion that what the 
sophist teaches can be taught quickly, suggesting that part of the delight 
of studying with a sophist is the speed and ease of it, and this is surely 
pleasurable. At 237b-c eristic or game playing is sharply contrasted with 
giving serious consideration to a question, again implying that sophistry is 
designed to be fun, a sort of pleasure. Finally, as we have seen, the sophist 
promises to be able to teach his students to controvert and debate others 
on whatever subject he chooses (232a-e), and so, since the sophist appears 
amazingly knowledgeable and most wise to his students (233a-c, 234c), 
they too can expect the pleasure of appearing knowledgeable and wise 
to others, once they have digested the sophist’s lessons.
The claims or accounts produced by sophists, then, appear to their 
audience to expound upon the nature or characteristics of certain subjects 
of debate or discussion, especially the virtues (224b-e). They have this 
appearance because the sophist deliberately fashions them to be (i) prima 
facie plausible, and therefore appealing, to the ignorant, (ii) resonant with 
popular views, and so more acceptable to those who already hold those 
views or those who are familiar with them, and (iii) a source of pleasure 
and gratiﬁcation to those who are amused by, and who admire as wise, 
those who contradict and confuse others and who will take pleasure in 
thinking themselves wise in learning how to do the same. In a sense, then, 
the appearances that are the product of sophistry are jointly produced 
by the sophist and the audience, though it should be stressed that in the 
Sophist the audience members are depicted as innocent youth exploited 
for their cash, whose ignorance and inexperience are taken advantage of 
by the sophist, who knowingly deceives them.26
The moral of the analogy, then, is that what the sophist produces is 
analogous to the products of the artisan, who is wholly concerned with 
the way his representation seems, not how it really is, or how the thing it 
represents really is. This manufacture of falsehood is essential to the craft 
of the kind of artisans the Stranger has mentioned because they are in the 
business of producing a certain visual effect, and so must compensate for 
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viewer perspective. If they did not, the visual experience of the intended 
audience would not be pleasing or gratifying, since the appearance 
would no longer be a beautiful one, and so they would have failed to 
bring about the desired effect.27 For the sophist, the manufacture of 
falsehood is similarly connected to the appearance of beauty in the service 
of illusion, and gratiﬁcation or pleasure. Sophists, like artists, are in the 
business of providing an appearance that is false, but which is designed 
not to draw attention to its essentially illusory nature. If they did not 
succeed they would have no followers and no income (232d; 233b). Unlike 
artistry, however, the practice of sophistry is disingenuous in the sense 
that it aims to deceive the audience about the intentional object (240c-d). 
This is borne out in the observation that it is necessary for the sophist to 
produce what appears to be thus-and-such but is not, i. e., produces what 
is false, and which serves to please and gratify his audience, but he can 
never boast or take pride in his ability to create an illusion. So while the 
mimetic artistry discussed is analogous to sophistry in the respect that 
they produce appearances–representations that are necessarily false (or 
the contents of which are false)–that are designed with facts about the 
audience’s perspective taken into account, it is disanalogous in the respect 
that artistry, unlike sophistry, aims to put the audience in mind of a true 
or accurate idea of the intentional object. Where artists skillfully craft 
their false appearances so as to correct for brute physical facts about the 
audience’s perceptual perspective, sophists take advantage of contingent 
facts about their audience’s intellectual perspective in order to produce 
their false appearances.28
There is, however, a major obstacle to this reading of this section of 
the dialogue. If, according to Plato, it is the acquisition of actual and not 
ersatz knowledge, especially knowledge of virtue, that leads a person to 
have a beautiful soul and achieve eudaimonia, why does he not transmit 
knowledge by writing treatises, as his most gifted pupil was to do? In 
producing dialogues instead, is he not derelict in his duty to tell us the 
truth unadorned, according to his own cherished philosophical goals, as 
I have understood them? What is more, is he not, insofar as he fashions 
an image or imitation (i. e. of philosophical conversation) producing the 
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very thing he is critical of at 236b-e as necessarily false and productive 
of ignorance (and so, not of beauty but ugliness in the soul)–a mere 
appearance of something, that seems to be like the beautiful thing of which 
it is an image, but in reality is not? Plato cannot avail himself of the artist’s 
defence, that he is merely adjusting for brute physical facts about his 
audience’s perceptual perspective, since in his case, as with the sophists, 
it is the audience’s contingent and mutable intellectual perspective that 
is relevant. The question, then, is this: in his use of the dialogue form, 
involving as it does character depiction, literary ﬂourishes and devices, 
and depiction of drama, is not Plato choosing to make art and falsehood 
instead of imparting knowledge?
IV. The problem of writing and the dialogue form
The objection just formulated depends on the assumption that Plato 
thought that one could simply impart or transmit knowledge from one 
person to another by presenting, in the form of a treatise, a series of 
straightforward knowledge claims written in the voice of the author, for 
anyone to read and absorb. As many scholars have recently observed, 
however, there is very strong and considerable evidence that Plato did 
not share the view, common today, that this is easily achieved–namely 
the fact that his not inconsiderable life’s work was written in dialogue 
form, in which he himself never appears as a character.29 That is, Plato 
never presented straightforward theories or claims to knowledge in his 
own voice. In the Phaedrus, Socrates relays a mythical attack on writing 
that suggests a reason why Plato eschewed writing treatises. Far from 
being an elixir for memory, written texts serve to impoverish people’s 
memories, because they trust too readily in the text as authoritative (275a). 
Treatises up until Plato’s time had been written as pronouncements of 
claims presented as certain and as constituting knowledge on the topic in 
question.30 Frede has argued that behind Plato’s concern with the authority 
of a treatise lies an ‘elevated’ conception of knowledge, likely as a result 
of (the historical) Socrates’ inﬂuence, according to which only a view or 
account that is not open to further questioning and is beyond doubt is 
one that can be simply laid out for others, as a fait accompli.31
Plato on Art, Perspective, and Beauty in the Sophist
L&A 2009.1.indd   200 9/9/09   8:50:00 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 201 
In the Phaedrus Socrates also suggests that the necessarily static 
character of a written text further compounds the problem of the text’s 
assumed authority–a reader cannot ask the text questions, communicate 
when she is not following the line of argument, or challenge assumptions 
(275c-e, 276c; cf. the ‘Seventh Letter’, 341c-e; 344b-c). In the Sophist, Plato 
has the Stranger echo precisely this worry in his criticisms of Parmenides 
and other Presocratic philosophers who presented their thought in 
the form of straightforward, authoritative claims. The Stranger says to 
Theaetetus at 242c that ‘they each appear to me to tell us a story, as if we 
were children … .’ He later qualiﬁes the remark at 243a-b: ‘… they’ve been 
inconsiderate and contemptuous towards us. They’ve simply been talking 
their way through their explanations, without paying any attention to 
whether we were following them or were left behind.’
How was Plato to proceed, then, given the enormously high value he 
placed on knowledge? A strong clue is given in the Stranger’s response 
to Socrates’ question how it is best to explain something to somebody, 
right at the beginning of our dialogue (217c-e). There he says that it is 
best to proceed by the method of question and answer, so long as he has 
a tractable interlocutor, and that the second best method is to give a long 
speech.32 Giving a long speech is the equivalent of reciting a treatise, and 
we have already seen the drawbacks of a treatise. The question now, then, 
is what has Plato accomplished in having the Stranger employ the ‘best’ 
method in a written text?
The answer, I would like to suggest, is that he has produced in his 
dialogues a literary form by which he is able to instruct the reader, not 
only in the positive views put forward by the Stranger, but also in how 
to come to her own reasoned judgment about the issues, to ‘give birth’ 
in an intellectual sense, and so to facilitate her coming to knowledge. 
He has achieved this, I will try to show, by presenting in his portrayal 
of the interlocutors a carefully fashioned model to the reader of how to 
critically examine a series of claims and assess their merit on her own. 
Now since this undeniably involves Plato in presenting an imitation 
of critical inquiry, he has in fact provided the reader with an image or 
representation of something, and not the thing itself. It is, moreover, an 
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imitation that is impressionistic and open to interpretation, the production 
of which requires a certain literary talent and ﬂair. Plato has, therefore, 
produced the kind of thing that he and others down the centuries have 
associated with art and artistic endeavour. I will argue, however, that he 
has not produced a work that is characterised by that feature he was so 
critical of in the case of art (and, as we have seen, in the case of sophistry), 
namely, that it necessarily represents falsely. He does this, I will claim, by 
producing a work that systematically draws attention to itself as presenting 
a particular ‘perspective’ or critical response to the positive views tendered 
by the Stranger. In this sense it presents itself as providing a provisionary 
yet positive view of the issues, open to further examination should the 
need arise, and which at the same time demonstrates how to come to 
one’s own similarly provisionary view. In the remainder of this section, I 
will discuss the Sophist as a model of critical examination, before turning 
to the question of the status of the dialogue as art.
Theaetetus’ role in the dialogue strikes one as signiﬁcant in modeling 
appropriate dialectical behaviour in a number of respects. As a precursor 
to Theaetetus’ being able to properly evaluate the series of claims he offers 
for consideration, the Stranger ensures that the young man manages to 
understand him as he progresses through the arguments. From early on, 
Theaetetus is conﬁdent enough to say when he doesn’t understand (e. 
g. 222d9)33, and the Stranger carefully monitors his comprehension at 
certain points (e. g. 238d-e). Next, we notice that the Stranger continually 
challenges Theaetetus to be actively involved by thinking hard about 
the questions he poses during the discussion. Their task is to identify 
the sophist ‘by means of a verbal explanation (logos), rather than doing 
without any such explanation and merely agreeing about the name’ (218c). 
And he often presses Theaetetus to answer with what he thinks is the 
right answer, not to simply agree with him out of habit,34 even causing 
him to protest at one point, ‘you’re demanding some quick thinking on 
my part!’ (226c12).
Noteworthy, too, is the Stranger’s demand that Theaetetus remain 
aware of what has already been agreed upon in their conversation, in 
order to maintain logical consistency throughout (240c). The dialogue 
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is peppered with his insistence that Theaetetus recall something that 
has been said earlier, and to examine in detail the frequently complex 
question whether or not it conﬂicts with what they have just assented 
to.35 Finally we observe that Plato has the Stranger instruct Theaetetus 
on how to engage in conceptual analysis and a priori reasoning through 
demonstration, thereby offering instruction to the reader as well. For 
example, at 251d, the Stranger asks him whether they ought to ‘refuse to 
apply “being” to change and rest, or anything else’ on the grounds that 
they are incapable of sharing in one another, or whether they ought to say 
that some kinds are capable of sharing in some other kinds, or all kinds 
in all. When Theaetetus cannot offer any answer, the Stranger directs him 
to consider the three logical possibilities one by one, and in particular 
to examine what consequences would follow from each (251e), thereby 
illustrating the kind of analysis he thinks it best to give (cf. 237b).
In making Theaetetus an active participant in the discussion in these 
ways, the Stranger is portrayed as indirectly teaching Theaetetus to critically 
examine a proposition by searching for the conditions under which he 
would judge it to be false. Theaetetus shows that he has learnt how to 
discern these conditions at least once in the dialogue. When considering 
the possibility that all kinds partake of all kinds at 252d, Theaetetus jumps 
in, conﬁdently announcing ‘even I can solve that one’. He says that Motion 
itself would absolutely rest and Rest itself, in turn, would absolutely 
move, if they came about in reference to one another.36 Theaetetus clearly 
presents this state of affairs as a counterfactual, which the Stranger afﬁrms 
by adding ‘but this is by the greatest necessity impossible, that Motion 
be at rest and Rest be in motion’ (252d9-10). Here, Theaetetus has lighted 
upon what he and the Stranger take to be a conceptual truth, and since it 
contradicts the proposition under consideration, it is taken by the pair as 
sufﬁcient reason to discard it as false.
Since the Sophist contains a number of positive theoretical claims about 
both sophistry and metaphysics,37 it seems certain that Plato considered 
this set of claims worthy of serious consideration. Moreover, they are 
articulated by the Stranger, a character who is depicted as an authority 
several times over: He knows well the complex account of sophistry 
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that he has heard many times before in his native Elea; he is greeted 
with a certain amount of awe by Socrates, who suspects he might be a 
god of refutation; and though Socrates’ worry is allayed by Theodorus, 
he nonetheless attributes a measure of divinity to the Stranger, since he 
calls all philosophers divine (216a-c). But far from having the Stranger 
deliver a lecture–a verbal treatise–to those present, Plato has him guide 
Theaetetus through his lengthy set of questions and proposals. If, as I have 
urged, we pay attention to the dramatic features of the portrayal of the 
interlocutors in the Sophist, a picture emerges of an exceptionally bright 
young man being taught how to be actively involved in the production 
of the accounts of sophistry and being–concentrating hard throughout, 
and straining to articulate considerations that are both defensible and 
decisive at each point in their lengthy conversation.38 The Stranger offers 
Theaetetus and the others positive claims and views as well as a model 
of a method for examining them, and coming to one’s own evaluative 
judgment about them. Of course this is what Plato offers the reader as well, 
the opportunity to formulate, examine and come to reasoned conclusions 
about the issues on her own. The Sophist is in this sense a ‘maieutic’ or 
midwifely dialogue.39
V. Images, falsehood, and the question of art
Let’s now return to the question of the potential problem for Plato of not 
writing a treatise but instead fashioning an impressionistic and imitative 
depiction of characters in conversation that is open to interpretation. We 
saw above that Plato had the Stranger assert that an essential feature of 
sophistry was the production of falsehoods. This production was said 
to be analogous to the creation of paintings and monumental buildings, 
which are false appearances in the sense that they are deliberately designed 
to take viewer perspective into account. In producing an imitative 
representation, a picture or image of a particular type of philosophical 
conversation, is not Plato doing the same thing, namely, producing a false 
appearance?
I do not think he is. The crucial difference between the appearances 
that the sophist and the architect or painter produce on the one hand 
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and the dialogues that Plato produces on the other is that it is necessary 
to the former, but not the latter, to conceal the discrepancy between the 
imitative representation and the reality it represents. It is necessary that 
the artisan conceal the discrepancy in order to produce the visual illusion 
of correct perspective, in order to achieve the goal of compensating for 
viewer perspective. It is necessary that the sophist conceal the discrepancy 
in order to preserve the impression that he is knowledgeable about a vast 
range of subjects and so qualiﬁed to teach them in his entertaining way 
and receive payment for it. By contrast, there is no necessity for Plato 
to produce a piece of writing that appears to be some thing, or in some 
way, but is not. He does not present something that purports to present 
the truth or a piece of knowledge about something (in the ‘elevated’ 
sense of being beyond revision), so there can be no falsehood on that 
score. What is more, Plato has self-consciously produced a piece, in the 
Sophist, that is ostentatiously perspectival, i. e. a depiction of a critical 
response to the Stranger’s propositions and questions that is speciﬁc to 
one person–Theaetetus.
For it is Theaetetus’ requests for further explanation that the Stranger 
responds to, Theaetetus’ queries that are answered, and Theaetetus’ 
puzzlement that gives the Stranger pause and causes him to monitor the 
young man’s progress. It is also Theaetetus’ easy comprehension–and the 
consequent lack of further explanation at certain points–that the reader 
has to live with. And no one who has spent any effort trying to come 
to grips with the dialogue will have failed to groan inwardly at some 
point in their reading when Theaetetus, faced with a difﬁcult and nearly 
impenetrably terse bit of reasoning from the Stranger (e. g. 255c13-d7), 
agrees without question, responding merely with an infuriating ‘how 
not?’ or ‘it is just as you say’. In these ways and others, Plato reminds the 
reader that she is reading a depiction of a particular conversation between 
particular characters that almost certainly would have been different with 
different participants.40 In those dense and difﬁcult passages not queried 
by Theaetetus, I submit, Plato is attempting to force the reader to take 
an active part in the dialogue just as the reader has seen the Stranger 
encourage the young man to. In doing so, I suggest, Plato has produced a 
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work that deliberately draws attention to itself as merely a representation 
of one particular philosophical conversation, in which the skills for correct 
analysis are accurately depicted but the conclusions drawn and analyses 
offered are not intended as ﬁnal, or to be accepted unreﬂectively by anyone. 
Plato has, in producing a work that draws attention to its imitative status 
and demands interpretation in these ways, produced an artwork that 
facilitates the process of coming to knowledge, and the aesthetic experience 
that comes with it, rather than thwarts it.
This last claim will seem to some readers to be a problematic one 
to attribute to Plato. For Plato is notoriously disparaging about artists 
and their works, going so far as to have Socrates banish them from the 
ideal city described at length in the Republic (595a ff.). I cannot hope to 
debate the issue adequately here, but in defense of my claim I offer two 
considerations. At 235d-e, the Stranger delineates one kind of image-
making that is called ‘likeness making’ (eikastikê, 235d6 ff.). Unlike the 
production of appearances, likeness making produces images that are 
faithful to that of which they are images. In the following passages, as 
we have seen, appearances are images that are characterised by being 
false, in the case of artists and sophists. The strong implication is that 
likenesses are images or representations that are not false. And since Plato 
has deliberately pointed out that there are such faithful representations, it 
seems reasonable to entertain the idea that this is what he is taking himself 
to produce in his depiction of dialectic.41 If this is right, then it will turn 
out to be more strictly correct to characterise Plato’s dialogues as eikastic 
imitations, the kind of imitations that produce faithful likenesses, at least 
to some extent. Perhaps, then, a dialogue is analogous to a draftsman’s 
blueprint in the sense that it faithfully depicts a type of conversation-
philosophical dialectic-but unlike it in presenting a particular token of 
such a conversation, between particular people and on a particular topic, 
i.e. a conversation from a particular perspective.42
Second, in the Republic itself not all mimesis is excluded from the ideal 
city. At least, Socrates allows some poetry and drama in the education 
of the young in books II and III (377b-398b, cf. 607a), and although he 
declares that the poets will not be permitted in the kallipolis he does say 
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that if an argument can be made for the usefulness of the mimetic craft 
it will be allowed some part in the city.43 Nehamas has also pointed out 
that Plato’s hostile stance towards art and artists ought to be taken in its 
historical context, as an attack on only a particular kind of art, dramatic 
poetry. As such, Plato’s criticisms are aimed at art that seeks to entertain 
and gratify its audience and which, importantly for my purposes, presents 
itself in a transparent way, not as a (perspectival) representation or 
impression that stands in need of interpretation, but deceptively, as though 
it were a faithful image of what it represents.44 This leaves room for the 
production, in writing, of an imitative representation of what Socrates 
tells us in the Phaedrus that the dialectician does, when he ‘chooses a 
proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by 
knowledge–discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who 
planted it …’ (276e-277a).
Conclusion
Throughout this paper I have been arguing that even though neither 
beauty nor art are in the forefront of the conversation between the Stranger 
and Theaetetus, the Sophist can be read as signiﬁcant for our understanding 
of Plato’s contribution to aesthetics. This is in part due to the central–and, 
I argued, constitutive–role accorded to beauty and the aesthetic in Plato’s 
thought, since that role is inextricably tied to the process of coming to 
knowledge for Plato and the Sophist betrays a deep concern with that 
process, in both its genuine and ersatz forms, in philosophy and sophistry. 
But it is also in part a result of Plato’s analysis of the necessarily illusory 
nature of sophistry and certain mimetic arts, in their respective production 
of appearances, in contrast to the practice of philosophy. The contrast, I 
argued, did not turn on the claim that while sophistry and these forms of 
mimetic artistry produced false images, or ideas or assertions, philosophy 
produced straightforwardly true versions of the same. Rather, the contrast 
depended on the claim that while sophistry and certain mimetic arts by 
their very nature conceal their perspectival nature, dialectical philosophy is 
conducted in such a way–that is, by way of critical conversation informed 
by reason–that attention is drawn to the particular intellectual perspective 
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from which any view is put forward. I further argued that this analysis 
in the Sophist suggests an explanation for why Plato deliberately chose 
to write in dialogue form: this literary form represents an effort to draw 
the reader’s attention to the perspectives from which the various claims 
and accounts offered by the Stranger, and queried and discussed by 
Theaetetus, issue. 
Finally, the Sophist adds to our understanding of Platonic aesthetics 
by presenting the reader with a work that we can characterise as mimetic 
(even if it should be strictly characterised as a likeness or as eikastic 
imitation) and is to this extent an artistic work, at least by contemporary 
standards. It is, however, a work of art that models the process of critical 
examination, at the same time as offering a series of positive theoretical 
claims for the reader’s consideration in the accounts of being and of 
sophistry. In purposefully creating a written work that systematically 
alerts the reader to its status as a representation of one particular 
character’s critical response to the Stranger’s questions and propositions, 
I have argued that Plato has created a work that invites the reader’s own 
interpretation and her own exploration of the conditions under which a 
particular assertion or denial may be shown to be false. In contrast to other 
products of the mimetic arts and sophistry, the Sophist does not represent 
falsely, and in contrast to treatises written in the voice of the author, it 
does not implicitly claim an authority for itself that seeks to render its 
contents as beyond revision. Instead, I have argued, it urges the reader 
toward dialectical understanding, and, with it, the aesthetic: near the end 
of the dialogue, the Stranger tells Theaetetus that one should aim to follow 
what a person says and carefully examine it at each step, discerning the 
precise respect in which he says that something is the same or different. 
But he has described no mean feat, for accomplishing it is, he says, both 
difﬁcult and at the same time beautiful (259c4-5: ekeino d’êdê kai khalepon 
hama kai kalon).
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Notes
1  I am grateful to Peter Adamson, Eugenio Benitez, Anne Hewitt, and Richard Sorabji for providing 
critical and constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. I also owe a debt of thanks to 
Verity Harte, who was kind enough to let me read a penultimate version of her paper on a similar 
topic in Republic X, ‘Republic X and the Role of the Audience in Art’ (Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, forthcoming), which helped me to clarify my own thoughts about appearances, 
perspective, and the analogy between artistry and sophistry at Sph. 235d-236c.
2  The exceptions include Seth Benardete (1984); Eugenio Benitez (1996). Note that neither Stanley 
Rosen (1983) nor Noboru Notomi (1999), argue that the Sophist has aesthetics as one of its themes, 
or focuses on the dialogue as making an important contribution to our understanding of Plato’s 
views on art or aesthetics.
3  At 230c-e the Stranger describes a ‘cleansed’ soul as one that belongs to a person free of false 
opinions and who believes it knows only what it does in fact know, and a most clean and 
beautiful soul as one that will really be happy (eudaimonia). Even though the context is a 
discussion of the kind of process of cross-examination that results in the person being questioned 
being disabused of their hitherto ﬁrmly held beliefs, and so of a process or method strongly 
associated with Socrates, who is present, the formulation of a clean soul at 230d leaves it an open 
question whether or not a cleansed person in fact has any knowledge. But if Socrates implies, 
through his repeated denials that he possesses any knowledge in other dialogues, that knowledge 
is not possible, the Stranger surely does not. On the contrary, he proposes that knowledge 
amounts to getting it right about which forms mix with which, which go through all, if some 
make others capable of blending through mixing with them, and whether others always cause 
divisions among kinds (253b-c). The person who has this knowledge, he says, is none other than 
the philosopher, who stands close to being, though divine being is so bright that his proximity 
to it leaves him difﬁcult to make out (253c-254b). The Stranger then goes on to provide what 
looks like a series of proofs concerning precisely these relations among kinds or Forms, strongly 
implying that he takes it that knowledge about these is perfectly possible.
4  Michael Frede (1992: 201).
5  Plato makes it clear in the Republic that knowledge of the Forms, including those that correspond 
to justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, and piety, is integral to the guardians’ development into 
virtuous people (475d-487b, 504c-d, 513b-c, 520c, 536a, cf. 520a-b, 521a, 506a-b, 540c). Thus, to the 
extent that the ﬂourishing of the city is mirrored in the individual who achieves eudaimonia, the 
attainment of knowledge of the Forms, including the virtue Forms, is necessary for happiness.
6  Symp. 210c-e (translations from the Symposium and the Phaedrus are those of Nehamas and 
Woodruff, in Cooper (ed.) (1997)).
7  Diotima says that the lover’s soul is ‘… turned to the great sea of beauty, and, gazing upon this, 
he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom, until, 
having grown and been strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge, and it is the 
knowledge of such beauty [i. e. the Form of Beauty] … (210d-e).
8  Later, Socrates declares that the philosopher, ‘… by consorting with what is divine and orderly … 
himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can’ (500c-d), and it is hard to imagine 
that this does not entail his being beautiful.
9  As if to echo the above mentioned claim in the Republic (see the previous n. 8), Socrates says that 
the soul of the philosopher, the person who has erotic relationships of this sort, is ‘as perfect as 
perfect can be’ (249c), an accolade that again strongly implies beauty.
10  I take it that the irony here lies in the attribution of wisdom to the famous sophist, and is not 
directed towards the strong association between beauty and wisdom in the soul.
11 Again, I take it that the irony is directed towards the attribution of such excellence to Socrates, not 
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to the connection between virtue and beauty in the soul as such.
12  Is Plato sliding here from the claim that knowledge is of beautiful things (cities, theories, Forms, 
etc.), to the claim that knowledge is itself beautiful? If we grant Plato the distinction between 
knowledge as a state of the soul and knowledge as the set of propositions etc., that is the object 
of intellect or nous, but independent of any particular soul or intelligence that might come to be 
cognizant of it, and suppose that in the ascent passage of the Symp. he is availing himself of the 
latter, then the move may be less worrying. At least, it seems to me at any rate to be a short step 
from the idea that a mathematical proof is of something beautiful to the idea that the proof itself 
is beautiful–though there is no scope here to discuss the question, or its implications, in proper 
detail.
13 I have deliberately left truth off this list, in order to claim only that truth is for Plato a necessary 
condition for knowledge, and avoid a stronger claim about the value of truth for Plato in the 
corpus generally, that it is valuable for its own sake. One obvious problem for the stronger claim 
is found in the Republic, where Socrates’ claims abut the general goodness and desirability of truth 
in books II and III (382b; 413a) is at least in tension with (and at worst contradicted by) his claim 
in book III that it is useful sometimes to lie, to produce a ‘noble falsehood’ (414b-c, cf. V 459c-d, 
II 378c-d). How to resolve the tension is a point of debate in the current literature. For example, 
Rachana Kamtekar (2006: 199) argues that the problematic reference to the ‘noble falsehood’ 
can be rendered less problematic by appeal to the notion of a deeper moral truth, while Raphael 
Woolf (2009: passim, but esp. 11-16) argues that the tension is best resolved by restricting the set 
of truths that are valuable in and by themselves, to a set of ‘philosophical truths’, truths about 
Forms, especially virtue Forms. I shall have nothing to say about that debate here; it is sufﬁcient 
for my purposes if we take it that in the corpus generally, truth in general has an instrumental 
value with respect to knowledge acquisition and is valuable in itself in the case of truths about 
virtues. By the time he wrote the Sophist I am inclined to think that Plato would have endorsed 
the stronger claim about truth in light of the causal connection between falsehood and the 
ugliness of the soul argued for at 228a-d, which is not restricted to a discussion about propositions 
concerning the virtues (or Forms), discussed above. Nothing, however, depends upon the point.
14  Cf. Frisbee Shefﬁeld (2001)
15  For a fuller discussion of goods that are not purely instrumental but also have intrinsic moral 
value for Plato, see Daniel Russell (2005: passim but esp. 21-42), though it should be noted that 
Russell prefers to speak of non-conditional and conditional goods rather than deploy the intrinsic 
/ extrinsic distinction, as, e. g. it appears in Christine Korsgaard (1983). See also M.M. McCabe 
(2005: 199-200), for an examination and defense of a similar relation between wisdom and 
goodness and happiness in the Euthydemus.
16  I take the Stranger to mean here that the members of these pairs thwart each other as a result of 
ignorance, and that the pairs sometimes even act against other pairs for the same reason.
17  Cf. Benardete (1984: II.105), Benitez (1996: 36).
18  As it stands, the reasoning here is poor. It needs to be supplemented by the later implication at 
236c-e that the sophist is only concerned with appearances, and their suitability to persuade this 
person or that, rather than with the truth. Then it would follow that the sophist would only light 
upon the truth by sheer good fortune, but happily dispense with the truth-bearing or veridical 
appearance as it becomes expedient for the refutation at hand (cf. Euthyd. 272a-b).
19   How should we understand the reference to colour at 235e? It is not clear from our dialogue, but 
perhaps Plato has in mind the practice of painters, reported by Aristotle at de Sensu 3 (440a7ff.), 
in which different colours are overlaid or superimposed upon one another to give the viewer the 
desired effect of the appearance of a different colour altogether. I am grateful to Richard Sorabji 
for drawing my attention to this passage.
20  The Stranger seems at 236d to be expressing uncertainty as to whether to associate the sophist 
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with appearance-making or likeness-making. However, he goes on at 236e, 240d, and again in the 
closing moments of the dialogue (see below) to do just that.
21  Note that Thrasymachus demands payment before answering Socrates’ question ‘what is justice?’ 
(337d), and is prone to giving long speeches, as sophists were known to do (e. g. 343b-344c).
22  I take Plato’s point here against the sophists to be roughly consistent with Aristotle’s view of 
courage in Nic. Eth. 3. Courage belongs, for Aristotle, in the realm of voluntary action and requires 
deliberation to the extent that courageous action and feeling is a consequence of a particular 
settled state of character, and this is something that is, in the long term, up to us (1114b21ff; cf. 
1112a17-1113a12). Therefore in situations of sudden danger, the brave person behaves properly 
by being ‘fearless and undisturbed’ because of his state of character, rather than as a result 
of calculation and deliberation that is immediately prior (1117a17-22). Now, deliberation that 
produces the settled disposition of courage, for Aristotle, concerns things about which we should 
be fearful or conﬁdent (1113a30ff.). The courageous person understands the truth about these 
things, and so has a certain kind of practical knowledge of them, we learn in book 6, in virtue of 
possessing practical wisdom (1138b35ff.). To be sure, this knowledge is mere practical knowledge, 
not the higher knowledge of ﬁrst principles that underpins the intellectual virtues, and so courage 
is by Aristotle’s lights only a moral virtue, not an intellectual virtue. Nonetheless, the connection 
for Aristotle between courage and wisdom is clear enough (cf. 1117a22-8).
23  Cf. the creation myth that Protagoras relates near the beginning of the Protagoras, in response 
to Socrates’ question how virtue is teachable, which seems to trade heavily on popular beliefs 
(320d-328a). I do not mean to suggest, here, however, that sophists were simple slaves to popular 
opinion, which clearly they were not (see e. g. Prot. 352c-353b), but rather that they exploit 
popular opinion in cases where it will make whatever argument they are putting forward more 
persuasive.
24  At 458c-d Callicles declares, having persuaded Gorgias to give a further public display of oratory 
(epideiknusthai, 447a) to Socrates and Chaerephon, who have just missed his presentation, that 
though he has attended many discussions before, the one currently being conducted between 
Socrates and Gorgias is giving him as much pleasure as any other, and he would be gratiﬁed if 
they would continue. I read Plato here as making it clear that the audience delights in the sorts of 
performances sophists routinely give, suggesting that, inter alia, it is pleasurable to see somebody 
outdone or confounded. This in turn gives further reasons for the enormous popularity of 
sophists among the youth of ancient Athens: their practice of sophistry is pleasurable to watch, 
and any audience member who manages to reproduce their arguments on his own later will 
manage to gratify himself with his abilities to confound others.
25  Gorg., 262d-e.
26  For the view that in Republic X, the target of Plato’s criticism is the audience, whose complicit role 
as cogenitors in the production of false appearances in the imitative arts makes them doxastically 
responsible for the harmful effects of this kind of art, see Verity Harte, ‘Republic X and the Role of 
the Audience in Art’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (forthcoming).
27  Cf. the Rep., where the depiction of certain extreme behaviours (such as excessive grief) in 
dramatic theatre also aims at the effect of gratiﬁcation and pleasure in the audience (603c-
606b). This image or mimetic representation does not, however, aim to gratify by means of the 
production of a beautiful appearance (of something that is not in fact beautiful), but rather by 
means of an appearance that appeals to the audience in another way, namely, by indulging the 
baser appetitive part of the soul that takes excessive pleasure in displays of excessive emotion.
28  Is this reading directly contradicted by Plato’s banishment of the mimetic arts from the kallipolis 
in Rep. X? Although there is no scope to adequately address the issue here, it is sufﬁcient for my 
purposes to point out that in the Sophist the Stranger is discussing the visual effect produced by 
a very limited range of mimetic artists. So although the artist aims at and is able to produce in 
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the audience true and accurate beliefs about the sensible (or physical) characteristics of the object 
represented, nothing necessarily follows from this about Plato’s (more complex) target in Rep. X, 
namely, the ability of the artist who crafts mimetic poetry to inculcate in the audience a set of false 
beliefs about moral or intellectual truths. See also section V below.
29  Plato’s chosen form of presentation has recently generated considerable interest in the question of 
the relation between the dialogue form and the philosophical content of his work, some of which 
has focused on his later work and even the Sophist in particular (e. g., Klagge and Smith 1992: Gill 
& McCabe 1996; Frede 1996, 1992; Benitez 1996; McCabe 1998, 2000; Blondell 2002).
30  Heraclitus DK B1; B108, but see B50; Parmenides DK B1.14; 22–32.
31  Frede, 1996: 140-1.
32  Does the Stranger’s insistence on a compliant interlocutor contradict my claim that Plato 
wishes the student to challenge the authority of the one offering the account or view? I think 
the Stranger’s behaviour throughout the dialogue shows that it does not, that what the Stranger 
clearly means when he requests a tractable respondent is someone who will cooperate with 
the learning enterprise. That is, he wants someone who will inter alia answer honestly, not 
simply agree because he is in the habit of it, remember what has been said before, try hard to 
think of reasoned answers to the question put to him, and not someone who will, like a sophist 
or (perhaps one of his eager students) focus his energies instead on making clever objections 
wherever possible and generally trying to wrong-foot the Stranger and create controversies (232b-
e). (For more on the pedagogical purpose of the role of the interlocutor in the Sophist, see below.)
33  222d9: ou manthanô; cf. 231b-c, 233a, 233e-234a, 242c, 249e, 251a, 257b.
34  227c, 229b, 232b-c, 232e, 233d, 236d, 239b, 249e-250a.
35  For instance, at 241a, the Stranger describes falsehood as saying that those which are are not, and 
that those which are not are. (As pointed out above, this is a summary of his more detailed claim 
in the preceding lines that falsehood says that what completely is in no way is, and that what is 
not is in a way (240e).) The previous conversation makes it plain that suitable examples of this 
are saying that something is small when it is in fact not small but large, or that something is hard 
when it is not hard but easy (234d), and is presented as analogous to an artisan who makes a large 
representation of something appear beautiful when it is in fact not beautiful but out of proportion 
(235e-236b). But then the Stranger asks Theaetetus whether the sophist will deny the charge, and 
adds that any reasonable person would want to reject it on the basis of what was said earlier 
(241a). Theaetetus understands that he is referring to Parmenides injunction against speaking of 
what is not. For the possibility of falsehood requires that they attach what is not to what is, the 
young man says,
36  and so they cannot consistently claim the possibility of falsehood as long as they accept this 
injunction. (For example, attaching the predicate ‘not large’ to what is in fact large in their 
description of the kind of falsehood the sophist inculcates in the young (234d), or their description 
of the appearance that the sophist creates as analogous to something that is ‘not beautiful’, even 
though it is presented as though it were (236b). See also 232a-c, 238d-239a, 249e-250a, 255b-c, 
256c-d.)
37  Many of the most striking of which were listed in section 3 above.
38  As the Stranger warned at the outset, taking part in the investigation led by him in the manner 
he has witnessed before and learned well requires no small effort (217e3-4, 218c5-7, 218d3-4, cf. 
217b2-4).
39  For further discussion of the Sophist as a maieutic dialogue, see my (2007: 317-19), on the Theaetetus 
as a maieutic dialogue, see Sedley (1996: 103; cf. 80, 95-6, 101-2; 2004: 5-35).
40  E.g. the Stranger’s comparison of his experience with the friends of the Forms and their doctrine 
with Theaetetus’ inexperience of them at 248b.
41  Benardete asks exactly the same question, but argues for quite the opposite view (1984: II.111). 
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His view is that the Sophist is a product of Plato’s practice of the phantastic, not eikastic, art. This 
reading is in part a result of his understanding of all phatasmata as images distorted or corrected 
for perspective so as to truly represent (so every phantasma functions in the way in which the 
appearance produced by the imitative artist does), and all eikastic images as undistorted but also 
not adjusted for the audience’s perspective (so that these images misrepresent in the sense that 
they do not put the audience in mind of the object with the correct characteristics or properties) 
(1984: II. 109-112). This reading seems to me to be untenable for the simple reason that the 
Stranger’s point is that the sophist does not put his audience in mind of a true representation 
(i.e. a representation whose propositional content is true): the analogy between the appearance-
making of sophistry and artistry comes apart at this point.
42  I am grateful to Richard Sorabji for making me think more carefully about this point.
43  607b-c. See also Janaway (2005: 7-13).
44  Nehamas (1988, 1999: 284-91).
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